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Summary 
 
This paper asks whether an exogenous increase in income in the context of a poverty 
alleviation program has an impact on child anthropometric outcomes.  The study 
looks at the Samurdhi Program in Sri Lanka and uses household data for 1999/2000. 
Using propensity score matching to account for selectivity bias, the paper finds that  
Samurdhi improves the height for age z-score of a child from a grant receiving family  
by roughly 0.40 standard deviations  with the impact driven mainly by children 
between six to 36 months of age, compared to if they did not receive the grant.  It also 
improves weight for height z-scores by around 0.45 standard deviations of children 
aged 36-60 months. These results are important for Sri Lanka where child nutrition is 
a cause for concern. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Can a monthly transfer of cash to a household in the context of a poverty 
alleviation program reach children and improve their health?   Evidence on such 
experience has been mixed.   In the US monetary transfers to poor families are argued 
to have little impact on child health (Currie(1995), Mayer(1997)).  On the contrary in 
South Africa, an old-age pension scheme that substantially increases income to senior 
citizens was shown to have a positive impact on girls' anthropometric outcomes if a 
grandmother receives the grant.  The study concludes that a cash transfer can be 
effective in improving child welfare but the efficiency of a public transfer program 
depends on the gender of the recipient (Duflo 2000).   On a different note some 
studies argue that income increase does not necessarily translate into an increase in 
calorie intake (Behrman and Deolalikar 1987), whilst this 'revisionist' claim has been 
refuted by Subramaniam and Deaton (1996) with an example from rural Maharashtra 
in India. 
However, can smaller transfers that top-up household income in the context of 
a poverty alleviation exercise and is targeted to the household itself rather than an 
individual have a positive impact on child health? This paper looks at this issue by 
considering a poverty alleviation program carried out in Sri Lanka--the Samurdhi 
National Poverty Alleviation Scheme.  Samurdhi is `holistic' in approach to solving 
the problem of persistent poverty.  Theoretically, it follows a simultaneous three 
pronged strategy that includes a monthly income transfer to poor households meant to 
raise nutritional status and welfare, a group savings and credit component that is 
aimed at reducing the vulnerability of the poor and a low-budget rural infrastructure 
development program aimed at easing village level bottlenecks in physical capital.  
The core of the program is the first prong: the income transfer to poor households.  
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The transfer consumes 80 per cent of the program budget, covers roughly 40 per cent 
of the population in the year 2000 and is pivotal in sustaining the other arms of the 
program.  The transfer component is also important as it implicitly forces people to 
remain with the Samurdhi and participate  in its various social-development and 
infrastructure programmes
1
. 
Samurdhi has met with criticism with respect to targeting (with the 
coexistence of large leakage errors and under-coverage) and as being partly a 
camouflaged attempt at reducing the problem of youth unemployment by recruiting 
unemployed youth to feed its colossal administrative structure (World Bank 2000, 
Gunatilaka et. al 1997).  However, did it achieve its aim of improving the nutritional 
levels and well-being of at least a part of the household--the children? 
This paper attempts to answer this question. I estimate the impact of the grant 
on the anthropometric outcomes of children aged six to 60 months using propensity 
score matching (PSM) to account for sample selection, with results checked for 
robustness using different matching algorithms including nearest neighbour, radius 
calliper and local linear matching.  Moreover, the results are checked against an 
alternative specification to make certain that they are robust.  I also discuss briefly the 
results of a parametric estimation using an endogenous switching regime model 
(ESRM) to corroborate the findings through PSM. Child well-being is proxied by the 
standardised anthropometric measure weight-for-height that indicates vulnerability to 
short-term impacts on nutrition and height-for-age z-scores that reflect accumulated 
investments to child health, following WHO(1986). 
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section two discusses the Samurdhi 
program in more detail and section three describes the data.   Section four discusses 
PSM, a nonexperimental technique, that estimates treatment effects under the 
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maintained assumption of selection on observables.   Section five discusses the results 
and checks for its robustness.  Section six concludes. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMURDHI PROGAM 
Samurdhi (meaning 'prosperity') is Sri Lanka's largest social assistance 
program launched in 1995 and eventually implemented by the government throughout 
the island.   It replaces its immediate predecessor the Janasaviya programme, 
implemented since 1989.  The overall aims of Samurdhi are to integrate youth, 
women and disadvantaged groups into economic and social development activities 
and to promote social stability and alleviate poverty (Samurdhi Act of 1995).  In an 
effort to meet these aims, the program follows a 'holistic' approach and thus various 
strategies. It differs, therefore, from most of the previous welfare policies of the Sri 
Lankan government implemented during the 1939-1989 period that included rice 
rations, food subsidy programs and the provision of food stamps. These programs are 
no longer operative.  It also differs substantially from poverty alleviation programs or 
welfare schemes that simply transfer cash.  Samurdhi's approach comprises an 
element of 'protecting' the poor and another of 'promoting' them out of poverty.  
Under the element of protection those in poverty are cushioned with a monthly 
income transfer.  The key aim of the grant is to raise the nutritional status and well-
being of recipient households.  Apart from this, the 'protection' component also has a 
so called "social insurance" scheme that covers contingencies (such as death, birth, 
illness and marriage) by offering an additional one-off payment and various small-
scale social development projects targeted at alcoholics, aged destitutes, school drop-
outs, etc.   The element aiming to promote the poor out of poverty looks to create the 
institutional support necessary to push people out of poverty through group savings 
and credit schemes and village-level rural infrastructure development programs.    
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The administrative structure of the Samurdhi program extends from a few key 
national bodies right down to village level development offices.  The program created 
around 40000 new jobs for unemployed youth both as division level managers and 
development officers by the year 1999/2000. 
The monthly income transfer targeted to families in poverty is the most 
significant aspect of the Samurdhi.  This is not only because it consumes a bulk of the 
grant (around 80 per cent of the overall Program budget in 1999), but also because it 
plays a pivotal role in implicitly forcing people to remain with the Samurdhi and 
participate in its various 'promotional' activities. A household receiving Rs. 500, for 
example, is expected to contribute four to five man-days of labour to community 
development projects.    Contributing "voluntary" labour is a mandatory requirement 
for Samurdhi beneficiaries and it is not clear whether this has an impact on household 
labour market activity.   
Samurdhi offers beneficiaries monthly coupons to the value of either Rs. 1000, 
Rs. 500, Rs. 250, Rs. 200 or Rs. 100 based on the number of household members and 
income levels.   The coupons can be exchanged for goods from the local co-operative 
store.  However, the net value is less than the nominal value (only for grants of Rs. 
1000 and Rs. 500), since deductions are made at source in lieu of compulsory savings 
and insurance premia.   The average grant received was Rs. 365.10, roughly 25 per 
cent of the monthly per capita household income of a grant receiving household.  It is 
also roughly a quarter of the poverty line of Rs. 1423 as measured by the Department 
of Census and Statistics in Sri Lanka for 2002.  The grant constitutes 15.6 per cent of 
the food budget of the poorest quintile and 12.8 per cent of the food budget of the 
second poorest.   It is most commonly exchanged for rice (on average 24 per cent of 
the household Samurdhi budget), sugar (25 per cent), soap (17 per cent) and lentils 
 8 
(14 per cent).   The grant is given to the household--with the 'household head', in 80 
per cent of the cases being an adult male, collecting the coupon.  There are no 
discernable differences in the average types of goods bought by gender of the 
household head.    
Technically, beneficiaries are supposed to exit the program when household 
incomes rise above a given threshold.  There is no evidence to say that this has indeed 
been the case in practice.  Also, if a household moves from a particular area their 
grant-status is cancelled and they are required to re-apply to qualify for the grant once 
again.   
Samurdhi uses the existing co-operative system to deliver its grants.  This 
means that certain weaknesses of the co-operative system spill into the delivery of the 
grant.  Anecdotal evidence suggest beneficiaries dissatisfaction over the 
uncompetitive prices of goods available, their quality, availability and the staff's 
refusal almost always to exchange coupon for cash, even though that is technically 
allowed (Gunatilaka et. al 1997).  The survey used in this paper shows that around 20 
per cent claim that co-op prices are higher than open market prices while 68 per cent 
find no difference in prices.  As for quality, 85 per cent claim that it is the same as in 
the open market.   
The design of the program lays down means testing as a condition for 
targeting beneficiaries.  It is acknowledged, however, that using income alone as a 
measure for targeting is difficult because of under-reporting and because poverty has 
more dimensions to it than can be captured by income.  Hence village-level 
Development Officers who were responsible for nominating suitable beneficiaries 
were advised to use other characteristics of welfare in conjunction with means testing 
to identify the poor.  These include the type of housing, roofing, walls, the lack of 
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access to a latrine, etc.  Beneficiary identification was a one-time affair conducted in 
1995 at the commencement of the programme.  Once the list of potential beneficiaries 
was compiled it was displayed in public places and grievances were addressed to the 
village or division level Samurdhi task force.  Identification was always at the 
household level and not the village or community level. 
In our sample (more details about the data used will be discussed later), 
around 40 per cent of the households receive Samurdhi.  Only around 64 per cent of 
them come from the two poorest expenditure quintiles.  Around 15 per cent  are from 
the two richest quintiles indicative of some amount of mistargeting and leakage
2
.  On 
the whole, however, the cash transfer component is progressive with a bulk of the 
recipients being 'poor' as far as desegregations by expenditure quintiles reveal.  
Moreover, the benefit incidence seems more equitable by region as well, since the 
poorest regions do get a higher allocation.  
3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
This paper users propensity score matching to evaluate the impact Samurdhi 
has on child health
3
.  Matching methods aims to 'select sufficient observable factors 
that any two individuals with the same value of these factors will display non-
systematic differences in their reaction to the policy reform' (Blundell and Dias 
2002:4).  In consequence, a child coming from a grant-receiving home can be 
'matched' with a child with the exact same observable characteristics but from a grant 
non-receiving household to isolate the impact of the grant on her health.  The 
counterfactual effect will be measured correctly only if the correct observable 
characteristics are chosen (Heckman et. al. 1997).   
 10 
The key identifying assumption for PSM is that the outcomes are independent 
of program participation, given a set of observables  (i.e., conditional independence- 
Heckman and Robb (1985)) is met.  This can be expressed as  
Y0 ┴  D | P (X) where Y0 is the outcome of interest in the untreated state, D is a 
dummy indicating participation in the program, X is a set of observable characteristics 
and P(X) is the propensity score.  Apart from the independence condition, the 
common support of overlap condition also needs to be satisfied.    It rules out the 
perfect predictability of D given X: 0 < p(D=1|X) < 1  (overlap).  It also ensures that 
children with the same X values have a positive probability of being both Samurdhi 
recipients and non-recipients (Heckman et. al. 1998). 
 
If both the above conditions hold, the treatment parameter can be identified using a 
weaker condition of conditional mean dependence:  E(Y0 | D=1, p(X))= E(Y0 |D=0, 
P(X)). The effect of the treatment on the treated TT can be calculated as follows: 
 
(1)  TT(X) = E(Y1 | D=1, P(X)) -  E(Y0 | D=1, P(X)) 
 
Thus the PSM estimator is the mean difference in outcomes over the common 
support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants. 
In implementing PSM, propensity scores on the covariates using probit  were 
estimated.  Then, each child was from a Samurdhi household (‘treated’ child) was 
paired with a group of comparable non-Samurdhi children.  Finally, the counterfactual 
outcome of the participating child was calculated as a weighted outcome of the 
neighbours in the comparison group.  The baseline results reported, use nearest-
neighbour matching, where each participant i is matched with a non-participating 
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child j  with the closest propensity score.  See Essama-Nssah(2006:12-14) for more 
details.  As robustness checks two other matching algorithms are used:   caliper and 
local linear matching.  Caliper matching imposes a tolerance level on the maximum 
propensity score distance of a neighbour.  This improves matching quality by 
avoiding the risk of bad matches that nearest neighbour matching faces, if the closest 
neighbour is far away.  A draw back, however, is that the choice of tolerance level is 
arbitrary (Smith and Todd 2005).  I also use local linear matching that uses weighted 
averages of all individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual 
outcomes.   The use of more information means that the variance is lower but on the 
down side some of the observations used may be bad matches.  This means that the 
proper imposition of the common support condition is important (see Heckman et. al. 
1997, 1998). 
 If the match made is of good quality, then the matching procedure would have 
balanced the distribution of the relevant variables in both the treatment and control 
groups.  To check the quality of the match is important because we condition on the 
propensity score and not on all covariates.  A common approach is the use of a two 
sample t-test to check that the means of the covariates are not significantly different 
between the treatment and control groups after matching even though such differences 
are expected before matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).  Apart from this, Sianesi 
(2004) suggests the use of the pseudo-R
2
.  This is computed by re-estimating 
propensity scores on the matched sample and comparing the pseudo-R
2
 before and 
after matching to indicate how well X explains the participation probability.  After 
matching it should be quite low as there should be no systematic differences in the 
distribution of covariates between the matched and control groups. 
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4. DATA 
The data for the main empirical analysis come from a one-off cross-section 
household survey, the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey(SLIS) carried out by the World 
Bank  with the help of the Sri Lanka Business Development Centre from October 
1999 to August 2000 throughout Sri Lanka.  The survey is the first of its kind and has 
not yet been replicated within the island.  It contains information for 7500 households 
within 500 communities (with 15 houses randomly selected within a community) and 
has an accompanying community and price data set.  It also contains information 
about heights and weights of children under five.  In an attempt to be representative of 
the entire island, the survey includes the war-torn North and East of the country.  
Unfortunately, this data is argued to be not representative of the area, providing 
information that is contrary  to conventional wisdom of the situation in these areas 
that have been subject to 17 years of civil war (Korf and Silva 2003:7, Narayan and 
Yoshido 2005:3).  This may partly be due to the fact that only the better off and 
accessible areas of the North and East were surveyed and even then, field work was 
disrupted by the prevailing conflict conditions with some households being revisited 
several times, over a period of time in order to complete (if at all) the questionnaire.  
In any case, the impact of the program on war-torn areas maybe misleading and not 
strictly comparable with other parts of the country as the government and other 
institutions face considerable constraints in functioning efficiently under volatile 
conditions in a conflict zone.  Moreover, in conflict areas and times household 
behaviour may be quite different to when conditions are more favourable.  
Behavioural differences may have an impact on choices for children (including 
nutritional investments), on the program, its outcomes and other variables and 
outcomes.  None of the national surveys carried out by the Department of Census and 
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Statistics or the Central Bank of Sri Lanka included these regions in their surveys ever 
since the outbreak of civil war in 1983, and it remains impossible to compare the 
information from the SLIS with another reliable source of data.  As such, I exclude 
data for the North and East from the estimations to follow.  Once sample weights are 
used, this accounts for around 12 per cent of the sample, which is consistent with 
estimations for the population share in these areas. 
Of the 5600 households in the survey (excluding those in the North and East) 
only 1072 have children between six to 60 months of age and of them only 821 have 
complete information on child anthropometry as well as the individual and household 
characteristics considered in this paper.  The errors maybe due to faulty measurement, 
reporting of age, coding or data entry.  A comparison of individual and household 
characteristics for the 251 dropped records and the 821 included ones show that the 
respective means between the two groups are not significantly different at the five per 
cent level for any observable characteristic.  It is therefore assumed that the portion of 
the sample that has been excluded is random as far as the observables are concerned.  
The 853 children in our sample come from 286 communities with the number of 
children per community ranging from one to eight.     
It should be noted here that nearly every child (98 per cent) from households 
that receive Samurdhi has been exposed to the Samurdhi program for all of his or her 
life whereas none of the children in the control group have been exposed to the 
program for any part of their life.   This makes adjustments for program exposure as 
in Duflo (2000) and Behrman et. al. (2000) unnecessary.  
Child well-being is proxied by two anthropometric indicators: weight-for-
height--the measure for short-term nutritional fluctuations in health and height-for-age 
that reflects accumulated investments in child health.  Weight for height is a measure 
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of body tissue and fat mass for an individual of a given length.   Weight for height z-
scores (whz) less than two standard deviations below the mean of zero is taken to 
indicate 'wasting' that can result from either weight loss or failure to gain weight.  
Marginally adequate food intakes and bouts of infectious illnesses can rapidly trigger 
the onset of wasting specially in young children  (WHO 1986, 1995)).  Note that the 
paper assumes that a higher weight for height maps into higher welfare.  This is 
because obesity is not a concern in the sample used.  The data contains almost no 
cases where a child's Body Mass Index (calculated as weight in kilograms divided by 
the square of height in meters) is above 30 points --the measure commonly used to 
define obesity.  Height for age z-scores (haz), on the other hand, reflects accumulated 
investment in health.  A child is considered 'stunted' if his or her haz is below two 
standard deviations of the mean of zero.     
5. RESULTS 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 for the outcomes variables (i.e., 
child weight for height z-scores and height for age z-scores) by unmatched (i.e., raw 
data) and matched samples.   The table presents mean values for Samurdhi recipients 
and non-recipients in column 1-2 and 4-5, with  a t-test for the equality of means 
reported in columns 3 and 6.  The results based on the raw data show that Samurdhi 
children are significantly worse off in terms of  whz in the full sample, the sample for 
older children aged 36-60 months and for boys and girls seperately.  These results are 
confirmed by the t-tests for the matched sample.  In terms of haz, once again 
Samurdhi children are worse off than the others, but this time the results between the 
unmatched and matched groups are not exactly the same.  For the unmatched sample, 
haz are significantly different for younger children aged six to 36 months and for 
boys.  In the matched sample, significant differences in haz are also seen for the full 
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sample and younger children aged six to 36 months but not for the gender based sub 
samples.   
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the conditioning variables used by 
unmatched and matched samples.  The main thing to note is that in the unmatched 
sample, all most all the conditioning variables used are statistically significantly 
worse-off for the Samurdhi group, indicating that they are indeed “poorer” not just in 
terms of income (excluding Samurdhi grant), but also in terms of the other associates 
to poverty such as access to a latrine, having electricity in the household, having 
access to safe drinking water, living in poor housing conditions, etc.  The Samurdhi 
children also tend to live in rural areas more so than the non-Samurdhi children, come 
from households that are female headed and have parents with significantly lower 
education levels and household with significantly lower expenditure per capita than 
their counterparts.  Moreover, birth weights for Samurdhi children are significantly 
lower and the number of siblings they have aged zero to five years is higher than that 
for non-Samurdhi children.  However, there are no significant differences based on 
gender of the child, household size or minority ethnic groups apart from Tamil.  In the 
matched sample, as expected, the difference between the treated and control groups 
are statistically insignificant, satisfying the balancing condition. 
Table 3 presents the key results of this paper:  the average treatment on the 
treated effect (ATT) of the Samurdhi grant on child whz and haz, using propensity 
score matching.  The results, therefore, reflect the difference between a Samurdhi 
child’s existing health outcome compared to what it would have been, had she not 
received the grant.  For the indicator for child short-term heath, whz, nearest 
neighbour and calliper matching estimates indicate that the Samurdhi improves it by 
0.50 standard deviations according to nearest neighbour matching, compared to had 
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they not received the grant, for older pre-schoolers aged 36-60 months.  These results 
are confirmed by other matching algorithms such as caliper and local linear, which 
show significant improvements of 0.37 and 0.50, respectively. 
For haz, the measure for accumulated investments in child health, again the 
impact is significant with nearest neighbour estimates indicating a positive impact of 
0.45, confirmed by the other matching algorithms as well.  The result seems to be 
driven mainly by younger children aged six to 36 months whose haz is positively 
affected by 0.51 standard deviations due to the Samurdhi.  Again these results are 
confirmed by estimations using alternative algorithms. 
ATT by gender, does not have a significant impact using any of the algorithms 
for whz or haz. 
Tables 4 and 5 discuss the quality of the match.  The probit estimates for the 
balancing score are presented in Table 4 for the full sample, children aged six to 36 
months, 36-60 months, boys and girls.  It is clear that most of the variables used are 
statistically significant, in all five cases.  The variables have been selected to reflect 
the income and non-income based criteria used to select households into the Samurdhi 
program while paying attention to factors that influence child health as suggested in 
the literature
4
. 
Table 5 displays results for t-tests for equality of mean between the treatment 
and control groups before matching and after matching for the samples used under the 
nearest neighbour, radius calliper and local linear matching algorithms.  The t-tests 
are significant before matching but not after matching using any of the specified 
algorithms.  Thus the sample is balanced after matching.  The pseudo-R
2 
 estimated in 
all cases is at least above 0.2 before matching but always less than 0.0 after matching, 
confirming once again that the quality of the match is good
5
.  Moreover, the 
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corresponding p-values for the likelihood ratio tests for the joint insignificance of all 
the regressors before  matching rejects this hypothesis in all cases while not rejecting 
it after matching in all cases.  Once again this indicates a good quality match. 
As a check of robustness of results, an alternative specification is used to re-
estimate them.  Once again, all the estimations are first checked to make sure that the 
quality of the match is high:  the t-test approach to check that the means of the 
covariates of both groups are not significantly different and the test using the pseudo-
R
2
 all confirm a good quality match.  Moreover, common support is imposed.  The 
results of the ATT effect is reported in Table 6.  For whz, the results are very similar 
to that of the baseline specification in terms of significance, with the Samurdhi having 
a significant positive impact specifically those between ages 36-60 months, using 
nearest neighbour, caliper and local linear algorithms.   
The results for height for age are significant for the full sample, only using 
caliper matching, which gives a coefficient slightly less than that under the previous 
specification.  More encouragingly, however, all three matching algorithms used 
show that the impact of Samurdhi is significant for the 6-36 month group, with 
coefficients very close to that under specification 1.   
Once again, there are no significant ATT effects reported under the samples 
divided by gender. 
As yet another check of robustness, I use a parametric estimation –an 
endogenous switching regime model (ESRM) estimated using the maximum 
likelihood method- to cross-check results (unreported but available on request)
6
.  The 
ESRM model allows for possibility that child health may be explained differently by 
grant receiving and non-receiving households, while accounting for the issue of 
sample selection.  The ESRM results show that Samurdhi has a positive impact of 0.5 
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standard deviations (bootstrapped standard error of 0.29) on haz.  This result is quite 
close to the PSM estimates of the effect of the Samurdhi on child long-term health
7
.   
6. CONCLUSION 
The analysis so far shows that a cash transfer in the context of a Poverty 
Alleviation Scheme can have a positive impact on a child's short-term nutritional 
status, proxied by weight for height z-scores as well as long-term nutritional status 
proxied by height for age z-scores.   The baseline results used propensity score 
matching.  Various tests for robustness were conducted including using various 
algorithms such as nearest neighbour, radius calliper and local linear matching.  The 
results indicate that the Samurdhi improves the weight for height of a child aged 36 to 
60 months by roughly 0.45 standard deviations (calculated as the average of effects 
estimated using three different matching algorithms and specification 1).  It also 
improves child height for age by 0.4 standard deviations (calculated as the average of 
the effect estimated using three different algorithms and specification 1), compared to 
what their health status would have been had they not received the grant.  Samurdhi 
has a particularly high impact on the height for age of younger children 6-36 months, 
showing a positive and significant improvement of over 0.5 standard deviations.  The 
results are robust to differences in specification.  They also match results of a 
parametric estimation using an endogenous switching regime model.  An interesting 
area for future research is to analyse the impact of Samurdhi by income group to 
ascertain whether children from poorer households benefit more than those from 
richer households. 
In summary, Samurdhi seems to have been effective in meeting its aim of 
improving household welfare levels, at least those of children between ages six to 60 
months of age.  The program seems particularly effective at improving accumulated 
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investments in health for younger children aged six to 36 months as measured by 
height for age z-scores.  It also seems particularly effective at reducing short-term 
fluctuations in health in older children aged 36-60 months as measured by the weight 
for height z-score.  These results are important for both the fact that they show that 
receiving the cash transfer can improve child welfare in the context of a poverty 
alleviation scheme and because of the Sri Lankan context where child nutrition is a 
cause for concern.  The result is also remarkable when juxtaposed with criticisms 
about the Samurdhi such as grant insufficiency and delivery problems.   
It is unclear as to how much of the improvement in health can be attributed 
purely to the cash transfer and how much to the various other components of the 
Program such as the positive externalities through forming small savings groups and 
increasing household savings, access to credit, advice and awareness on various social 
development aspects (household nutrition, home gardening, etc.,) lump sum payment 
at child birth as a part of the social insurance scheme, micro-enterprise schemes that 
all increase household capabilities, opportunity, mobility and voice.  Of course, each 
of the above prongs of the Program has not benefited all recipients equally and is 
often difficult to quantify.  For instance, only around 5 percent of those who receive 
the transfer (and have children aged five to 60 months) claim to have participated in 
the credit program and only 15 per cent have claimed insurance.   Moreover, these 
parts of the Program are rather progressive (unlike the grant itself that is regressive) in 
that many of the recipients in the poorer quintiles do not receive these benefits as 
much as those in the richer quintiles. Nonetheless, the empirical analysis could 
perhaps be refined to account for participation in other aspects of the program and 
account for externalities of such participation.  These are aspects for future research.  
All such modifications, however, would only help refine the analysis and decompose 
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the positive impact on child health among the various elements of the program. The 
crux of the conclusions in this paper are most likely to be left robust:  Samurdhi has a 
significant positive impact on the short and long-term nutritional status of a child who 
is most probably from a poor household, whether its driven purely or partially by the 
cash received. 
                                                 
     
1
 In this respect the Samurdhi is similar to other conditional cash transfer programs such as 
the PROGRESA in Mexico, FA in Columbia and PRADF in Honduras.  Behrman and Hoddinott(2005) 
have evaluated the impact of Mexico's PROGRESA on child nutrition to find that it  has a significant 
impact.  Under this program mother's receive cash transfers if their school-age children attend school 
and preventive healthcare visits. Attanasio and Mesnard (2006) evaluates the short-term impact of 
Columbia's FA program on child-height for age to find that it improves the nutritional status and 
morbidity of young children. However, some other conditional cash transfer programs such as the 
PRADF in Honduras had not improved child health (IFPRI 2002) as cited in Attanasio and Mesnard 
(2006).  
     
2
 Indicative also of mistargeting and leakage is the fact that the Samurdhi has been given to 
roughly 40 per cent of the sample where as poverty itself was estimated to be around 22 per cent in 
1995 by World Bank (1995) and around 28.8 per cent in 1995 by the Department of Census and 
Statistics in DCS (2002).  It was around 22.7 per cent in 2002 ( DCS 2002). 
3
  See Blundell and Dias (2002) and references there in for more details as well as alternative 
approaches available for program impact evaluation. 
4
 See for instance Engel et. al (1999), Mosley and Chen (1994), Schultz (1984) and references 
there in. 
5
 These results (i.e., insignificant t-tests on the difference of means between groups for all 
variables and favourable pseudo-R
2
) are present in all the estimations in this paper, confirming that the 
balancing condition is satisfied in all cases. 
6
 The ESRM specifies two well-being equations for children from households that receive the 
grant and those that do not, as follows: 
(2) ijijij
h 1101
~
 
        given that    
1js   
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(3) ijijij
h 2102
~
 
        given that    
0js  
where h is the weight for height z-score of child  i from household j and Z is a vector of weight for 
height determining variables and ε are the error terms.  The dependent variable is observed in the case 
of (2) if   
(4) 
0
~
 jj u   
And in the case of (3) in 
(5) 
0
~
 jj u   
Errors are normally distributed with
),0(~ 11  N  and ),0(~ 22  N  and )1,0(~ Nu  
with 











1
),,cov(
21
22212
11211
21






 u
 
And 11 )(  ucorr  and 22 )(  ucorr  
The systems are identified if Xj contains at least one exogenous variable that influences the selection 
equations but not the substantial equations.  In the empirical analysis two such variables are used: the 
presence of a disabled or chronically ill member in the household ("disability") and this disability 
dummy variable interacted with the education level of the child's father.  Vector Z contains all the 
variables in specification 1 of the PSM estimates apart from birth weight (as it may be endogenous) and 
seven dummies for province of residence.  See Maddala (1983) for further details on the model used. 
7
 The instruments used in the estimation (presence of a disabled member in the household and 
this variable interacted with father’s education) were checked for relevance and validity in a two stage 
least squares framework. This model itself is a restricted version of the ESRM model. However, the 
first stage regression can be used to identify if the instruments used are relevant and valid.  The first 
stage F statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments are jointly zero at the 
one per cent level, providing evidence of relevance. However, the first stage F-statistic was 4.4.  We 
cannot conclude, therefore, that there is no weak instruments issue. Estimators can perform poorly 
when instruments are weak (Staiger and Stock 1997; Stock and Yogo 2005). Suffice it to note, 
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however, that the ATT estimated from the ESRM model were also quite close to that estimated by 
matching methods and significant, in spite of the fact that the instruments chosen may be weak. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for outcome variables by unmatched and matched samples
 
 Unmatched sample Matched Sample 
Outcome variables Samurdhi 
recipients 
 
 
(1) 
Samurdhi 
non-
recipients 
 
(2) 
t-ratio (p-
value) testing 
for equality in 
means in (1) 
and (2) 
Samurdhi 
recipients 
 
 
(4) 
Samurdhi 
non-
recipients 
 
 
(5) 
t-ratio (p-
value) 
testing for 
equality in 
means in (4) 
and (5) 
Children aged 6-60 
months 
      
    Weight-for-height z-
score (whz) 
-0.94 (0.10) -0.68 (0.11) -1.83(0.06)* -0.92 (0.10) -0.72 (0.09) -1.42(0.15) 
   Height for age z-
score (haz) 
-1.55 (0.09) -1.38 (0.12) -0.98(0.32) -1.53 (0.13) -1.05 (0.12) -2.66(0.00)** 
       
Children aged 6-36 
months 
      
    Weight-for-height z-
score (whz) 
-0.71 (0.12) -0.58 (0.09) -0.80(0.21) -0.73 (0.13) -0.56 (0.09) -0.86(0.39) 
   Height for age z-
score (haz) 
-1.58 (0.15) -1.23 (0.11) -1.87(0.06)* -1.50 (0.17) -1.00 (0.19) -2.08(0.03)* 
       
Children aged 36-60 
months 
      
    Weight-for-height z-
score (whz) 
-1.28 (0.11) -0.78 (0.10) -3.18(0.00)** -1.38 (0.11) -0.58 (0.16) -3.95(0.00)** 
   Height for age z-
score (haz) 
1.57 (0.13) 1.56 (0.11) -0.04 (0.96) -1.43 (0.15) -1.56 0.27 (0.78) 
       
Boys 6-60 months       
    Weight-for-height z-
score (whz) 
-1.10 (0.10) -0.79 (0.09) -2.11 (0.03)** -1.06(0.11) -0.76(0.12) -1.73(0.08)* 
   Height for age z-
score (haz) 
-1.73 (0.14) -1.35 (0.10) -2.11 (0.03)** -1.68 (0.14) -1.79 (0.14) 0.58 (0.29) 
       
Girls 6-60 months       
    Weight-for-height z-
score (whz) 
-0.83 (0.13) -0.53 (0.10) -1.76 (0.00)* -0.87 (0.13) -0.53 (0.10) -2.00(0.04)* 
   Height for age z-
score (haz) 
-1.39 (0.15) -1.38 (0.12) -0.05 (0.95) -1.38 (0.16) -1.38 (0.12) -0.01 (0.99) 
Note:  Figures in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 are means, with standard errors in parenthesis.  * significant at 
the 10 per cent level, ** significant at 5 per cent or higher. The ‘matched sample’ outcomes for the 
various categories (i.e., children aged 6-60 months, children aged 6-36 months, children aged 36-60 
months, boys and girls) are calculated by using the corresponding matched samples that pass the 
balancing test (using specification 1 explained in the text) and fall into the region of common support, 
defined as the maximum of mins and the minimum of maxs.   
Source: Own calculations using Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 1999/2000 (excluding North and East). 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for conditioning variables by unmatched and matched samples
 
 Raw Sample Matched sample 
ConditioningVariable  Samurdhi 
recipients 
 
 
(1) 
Samurdhi 
non-
recipients 
 
(2) 
t-ratio (p-
value) testing 
for equality in 
means in (1) 
and (2) 
Samurdhi 
recipients 
 
 
(4) 
Samurdhi non-
recipients 
 
 
(5) 
t-ratio (p-
value) testing 
for equality in 
means in (4) 
and (5) 
Specification 1:       
    sex (male) 0.52 0.51 0.22(0.87) 0.54 0.55 -0.09(0.94) 
    age 6-12 months 0.10 0.12 -0.91(0.36)    
    age 12-18 months  0.09 0.13 -1.73(0.08)* 0.09 0.09 -0.00(1.00) 
    age 18-24 months  0.11 0.07 1.62 (0.10) 0.11 0.12 -0.37 (0.70) 
    age 24-30 months  0.09 0.14 -2.03(0.04)* 0.08 0.10 0.94(0.34) 
    age 30-36 months  0.13 0.09 1.85(0.06)* 0.13 0.11 0.84 (0.40) 
    age 36-42 months  0.11 0.13 -0.64(0.52) 0.12 0.11 0.37 (0.70) 
    age 42-48 months  0.11 0.10 0.33 (0.74) 0.10 0.11 -0.38 (0.70) 
    age 48-60 months  0.22 0.18 1.66(0.09)* 0.22 0.21 0.48 (0.62) 
    Birth_weight (kg) 2.79 2.90 -3.21(0.00)** 2.79 2.79 -0.10(0.92) 
    Expenditure 
    per household 
    member(Rupees) 
1165.43 
(554.40) 
2030.1 
(1487.62) 
-10.07(0.00)** 1169.5 
(612.93) 
1198.3 
(1499.2) 
-0.68(0.49) 
    Number of children 
aged 0-5 years   
1.30 1.35 -1.15(0.24) 1.30 1.29 0.46(0.64) 
    Number of children 
aged 6-14 years 
0.91 0.72 2.86(0.00)** 0.91 0.95 -0.41(0.68) 
    Household size 5.51 
(1.86) 
5.39 
(1.83) 
0.94(0.34) 5.52 
(1.82) 
5.33 
(1.82) 
1.23(0.22) 
    Mother’s education 
(years) 
8.7 
(0.19) 
10.1 
(0.1) 
-7.12(0.00)** 8.7 
(0.19) 
8.9 
(0.1) 
-0.74(0.46) 
    Father’s education 
(years) 
8.1 
(0.20) 
9.7 
(0.13) 
-8.09(0.00)** 8.2 
(0.20) 
8.2 
(0.13) 
0.03(0.975) 
    Tamil ethnicity 0.02 0.12 -5.28(0.00)** 0.02 0.02 0.54(0.58) 
    Water from 
unprotected source  
0.39 0.20 -6.31(0.00)** 0.39 0.42 -0.73(0.46) 
    No bathroom  0.17 0.08 3.74(0.00)* 0.18 0.21 -1.56(0.16) 
    Poor housing  0.49 0.34 -5.09(0.00)** 0.49 0.49 0.16(0.87) 
    Have electricity 0.49 0.73 -7.47(0.00)** 0.50 0.48 -0.40(0.68) 
   Distance to primary 
health care services 
(km) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
0.46 (0.49) 3.41(0.00)** 0.58 (0.49) 0.53 (0.48) 0.69 (0.49) 
Specification 2: 
Additional conditional 
variables introduced  
      
    Rural residence 0.83 0.62 6.64 (0.00)** 0.83 0.82 0.32 (0.75) 
    Household head  
    (female) 
0.18 0.13 1.68 (0.09)* 0.18 0.22 1.39 (0.16) 
    Other minority 0.06 0.09 -1.49(0.13) 0.06 0.08 -1.38(0.16) 
Number of 
observations  
326 527  294 510  
Note:  For the binary variables, the associated numbers in columns 1, 2,4 and 5 correspond to  
proportions.  For continuous variables, numbers are means, with standard errors in parenthesis.  * 
significant at the 10 per cent level, ** significant at 5 per cent or higher. The ‘matched sample’ means 
reported in this table are for the full sample of children aged 6-60 months after imposing common 
support, defined as the maximum of mins and the minimum of maxs.   
Source: Own calculations using Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 1999/2000 (excluding North and East). 
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Table 3: The Average Treatment on the Treated effect (ATT) of the Samurdhi grant on child 
health using propensity score  matching 
 Full Sample 
(children aged 
6-60 months)
 
Sample of 
children aged 
0-36 months
 
Sample of 
children aged 
36-60 months 
Boys aged 6-60 
months 
Girls aged 6-60 
months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome: 
weight for 
height z-score
 
     
Nearest 
neighbour 
-0.03 (0.17) 0.39 (1.20) -0.50 (1.64)* -0.29 (1.14) -0.14 (0.50) 
Caliper 
matching 
(radius=0.008) 
-0.06 (0.39) 0.25 (0.94) -0.38 (1.64)* -0.19 (0.80) -0.17 (0.62) 
Local linear 
(band 
width=0.009) 
-0.03 (0.16) 0.23 (0.85) -0.50 (1.70)* -0.21 (0.72) -0.11 (0.39) 
Outcome: 
height for age 
z-score 
     
Nearest 
neighbour 
-0.45 (1.92)* -0.52 (1.60) -0.51 (1.46) -0.17 (0.53) -0.10 (0.28) 
Caliper 
matching 
(radius=0.008) 
-0.36 (1.64)* -0.57 (1.85)* -0.31 (0.82) -0.32 (1.61) -0.18 (0.56) 
Local linear 
(band 
width=0.009) 
-0.45 (1.83)* -0.58 (1.84)* -0.39 (1.15) -0.21 (0.56) -0.23 (0.64) 
Balancing 
property 
satisfied 
YES
 
YES
 
YES YES
 
YES
 
Common 
support imposed 
YES YES YES YES YES 
% treated 
observations 
outside region of 
common support 
1.95 2.1 2.5 5.0 5.4 
Observations      
   Treated 295 158 134 168 122 
   Control 510 297 213 266 244 
Note:  Specification for estimations in column (1)-(3) (“specification 1”) comprises sex, child age 
cohort (between 12 to 18 months, 18 to 24 months, 24 to 30 months, 30 to 36 months, 36 to 42 months, 
42 to 48 months or 48 to 60 months, birth weight, household expenditure per capita, number of 
children under 6, number of children between 6- 12 years of age, household size, mother’s education 
level, father’s education level, whether water consumed comes from an unprotected or open source, 
poor housing condition, no private latrine within compound, no electricity, Tamil ethnicity, living in 
the rural sector and distance to nearest primary health care centre.  The specification for estimation in 
column (4) includes all the variables in specification 1 as well as expenditure interacted with poor 
housing and expenditure interacted with electricity to satisfy the balancing condition.  The specification 
for estimation in column (5) includes all the variables in specification 1 as well as the square and cube 
of household size and square of mother’s education in order to satisfy the balancing condition.  
Balancing property satisfied for all samples with differences in means of matched observables not 
significantly different from 0 at least at the 10 per cent level.  Common support is defined as the 
maximum of the mins and the minimum of the maxs.  .  Nearest neighbour estimator computed with 
replacement.  Local linear matching for estimations in column 2 and 3 use a band width of 0.03. 
Standard errors for the average treatment on the treated effect are computed using bootstrap with 50 
replications.  Resultant z-scores are reported in parenthesis,  with * significant at the 10% level and ** 
significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Own calculations using Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 1999/2000 (excluding North and East). 
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Table 4: Probit estimates for balancing score       
 Full sample Children 
aged between 
6-36 months 
Children 
aged between 
36-60 months 
Boys aged 6-
60 months 
Girls aged 6-
60 months 
      
Sex 0.03 (0.29) -0.06 (0.43) 0.12 (0.77)   
Age12to18 0.11 (0.53) 0.10 (0.48)  0.24 (0.76) 0.03 (0.12) 
Age18to24 0.46 (2.11)** 0.48 (2.11)**  0.46 (1.50) 0.54 (1.62) 
Age24to30 -0.14 (0.66) -0.11 (0.51)  0.01 (0.04) 0.24  (0.77) 
Age30to36 0.45 (2.11)** 0.46 (2.10)**  0.44 (1.46) 0.61 (1.88)* 
Age36to42 0.18 (0.88)  -1.33 (1.84)* 0.27 (0.92) 0.10 (0.35) 
Age42to48 0.26 (1.20)  -1.25 (1.71)* 0.17 (0.55) 0.44 (1.39) 
Age48to60 0.48 (2.52)**  -1.02 (1.42) 0.82 (2.91)** 0.17 (0.65) 
Lnexp -0.00 (7.19)** -0.00(6.09)** -
0.00(4.13)*** 
-0.00(3.59)** -0.00 (5.22)** 
Number of children 
under 5 
-0.25 (2.34)** -0.28 (1.93)* -0.24 (1.44) -0.30 (2.01)** -0.25 (1.54) 
Number of children 
aged 6-14 
-0.03 (0.43) -0.00 (0.03) -0.03 (0.37) -0.00 (0.04) -0.06 (0.60) 
Household size 0.05 (1.50) 0.04 (0.94) 0.05 (0.90) 0.10 (2.31)** 0.98 (1.57) 
Square of household 
size 
    -0.13 (1.58) 
Cube of household size     0.00 (1.55) 
Mother’s education -0.03(1.40) -0.05 (1.59) -0.01 (0.20) -0.04 (1.38) 0.40 (2.75)** 
Square of mother’s 
education 
    -0.02 (0.93) 
Father’s education -0.05(2.36)** -0.03 (0.96) -0.07 (2.34)** -0.04 (1.24) -0.06 (1.78)* 
Unprotected water 0.27 (2.34)** 0.31 (2.05)** 0.21 (1.24) 0.22 (1.39) 0.31 (1.86)** 
No latrine 0.29 (1.88)* 0.28 (1.36) 0.31 (1.28) 0.29 (1.41) 0.37 (1.46) 
Poor housing 0.21 (1.81)* 0.08 (0.47) 0.37 (2.22)** 0.34 (2.13)** 0.07 (0.43) 
Have electricity -0.17 (1.52) -0.18 (1.12) -0.16 (0.89) -0.30 (1.83)* -0.08 (0.45) 
Rural 0.25 (1.91)* 0.07 (0.43) 0.42 (2.18)** 0.39 (2.15)** 0.05 (0.24) 
Tamil ethnicity -1.35 (5.68)** -1.33 (4.09)** -1.33 (4.01)** -1.36 (4.24)** -1.45 (3.87)** 
Birth weight 0.22 (2.06)** -0.30 (2.00)** -0.115 (0.69) -0.26 (1.72)* -0.16 (0.93) 
Distance to primary 
health centre 
0.15 (1.33) 0.09 (0.60) 0.29 (1.70)*   
Expenditure*poor 
housing 
   0.00 (1.41)  
Expenditure*electricit
y 
   0.00 (1.61)  
constant 1.70 (3.41)** 2.36 (3.51)** 2.46 (1.64)* 1.26 (1.75)* -1.47 (0.88) 
Note:   T-statistics in parenthesis ,  with * significant at the 10% level and ** significant at the 5% level 
or above. 
Source: Own calculations using Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 1999/2000 (excluding North and East). 
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Table 5: Quality of the match:  t-tests for equality of means before and after matching (for full 
sample of children aged 6-60 months) 
 t-value of test 
before 
matching 
t-value of test 
after nearest 
neighbour 
matching 
t-value of test 
after caliper 
matching 
t-value of test 
after local 
linear 
regression 
matching 
Sex 0.22 0.09 -0.10 0.09 
Age12to18 -1.73 0.00 0.26 -0.13 
Age18to24 1.62 -0.37 0.21 1.18 
Age24to30 -2.03 -0.94 0.28 1.60 
Age30to36 1.85 0.84 0.10 1.45 
Age36to42 -0.64 0.37 -.0.31 -0.47 
Age42to48 0.33 -0.38 -1.12 -1.39 
Age48to60 1.66 0.48 0.66 -0.55 
Expenditure  -10.07 -0.68 -0.70 -1.38 
Number of 
children under 5 
-1.17 0.46 0.28 0.07 
Number of 
children aged 6-
14 
2.93 -0.41 -0.87 0.40 
Household size 0.94 1.23 0.86 1.09 
Mother’s 
education 
-7.12 -0.74 0.45 -1.41 
Father’s 
education 
-8.09 0.03 1.01 0.33 
Unprotected 
water 
6.32 -0.73 -0.49 -1.62 
No latrine 3.74 -1.56 -1.05 -1.47 
Poor housing 5.09 0.96 -1.07 0.55 
Have electricity -7.47 0.40 0.63 0.70 
Rural 6.64 0.32 0.19 -0.65 
Tamil -5.28 0.54 -0.47 0.54 
Birth weight -3.40 0.10 -0.49 0.43 
Distance to 
public health 
services 
3.41 0.37 0.40 0.37 
n 821 295 795 805 
Note: Test results provided only for full sample of children.   
Source: Own calculations using Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 1999/2000 (excluding North and East). 
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Table 6: The Average Treatment on the Treated effect (ATT) of the Samurdhi grant on child 
health using propensity score matching with alternative specification 
 Full Sample 
(children aged 
6-60 months)
 
Sample of 
children aged 
0-36 months
 
Sample of 
children aged 
36-60 months 
Boys aged 6-60 
months 
Girls aged 6-60 
months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcome: 
weight-for-
height  z-score 
     
Nearest 
neighbour 
-0.04 (0.20) 0.12 (0.40) -0.68 (2.19)*** -0.21 (0.64) -0.39 (1.34) 
Caliper 
matching 
(radius=0.01) 
-0.07 (0.40) 0.17 (1.12) -0.53 (2.24)*** -0.27 (1.35) -0.47 (0.74) 
Local linear 
(band 
width=0.006) 
-0.04 (0.23) 0.03 (0.10) -0.54 (1.82)** -0.25 (0.95) -0.13 (0.54) 
Outcome: 
height-for-age 
z-score
 
     
Nearest 
neighbour 
-0.33 (1.35) -0.56 (1.69)* -0.55 (1.36) -0.13 (1.39) -0.33 (1.16) 
Caliper 
matching 
(radius=0.01) 
-0.21 (1.80)* -0.35 (1.76)* -0.07 (0.50) -0.24 (0.80) -0.32 (1.12) 
Local linear 
(band 
width=0.006) 
-0.35 (1.42) -0.56 (1.64)* -0.44 (1.44) -0.01 (0.02) -0.16 (0.42) 
Balancing 
property 
satisfied 
YES
 
YES
 
YES YES
 
YES
 
Common 
support imposed 
YES YES YES YES YES 
% treated 
observations 
outside region of 
common support 
0.37 0.43 1.4 2.7 1.0 
Observations      
   Treated 308 166 138 156 139 
   Control 510 297 213 266 244 
Note:  The estimation results reported in this table have a specification less parsimonious than that of 
baseline results reported in Table 2. All new variables included in the specification have a significance 
of at least 10 per cent in the probit estimates. Specification for estimations in column (1) comprise sex, 
child age cohort (between 12 to 18 months, 18 to 24 months, 24 to 30 months, 30 to 36 months, 36 to 
42 months, 42 to 48 months or 48 to 60 months, birth weight, log of household expenditure per capita, 
number of children under 6 and between 6- 12 years of age as a proportion of household size, log of 
household size, mother’s education level, whether water consumed comes from an unprotected or open 
source, poor housing condition, no private latrine within compound, no electricity, Tamil ethnicity, 
living in the rural or urban sector and whether the household head is female.  The specification for 
estimations in columns (2) and (3) include all of the above as well as whether the household belongs to 
a minority ethnic group (other than Tamil) in order to satisfy the balancing condition.  Columns (4) and 
(5) include all the variables included in the estimation in column 1 together with whether the household 
belongs to a minority ethnic group (other than Tamil) and the square of household size, in order to 
satisfy the balancing condition. Balancing property satisfied with differences in means of matched 
observables not significantly different from 0 at at least the 10 per cent level.   Common support is 
defined as the maximum of the mins and the minimum of the maxs. Nearest neighbour estimator 
computed with replacement.  T-statistic in parenthesis,  * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at 
the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations using Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 1999/2000 (excluding North and East). 
